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Abstract 
The subsidisation of mosquito nets has been widely used to increase ownership in 
countries where malaria represents a public health problem. However, an important 
question that has not been addressed empirically is how far net subsidy programmes 
increase ownership above the level that would have prevailed in the absence of the 
subsidy (i.e. incremental ownership). This study addresses that gap by investigating the 
impact of a large-scale mosquito net voucher subsidy - the Tanzania National Voucher 
Scheme (TNVS) - on short-term demand for unsubsidised commercial nets, estimating 
a household demand model with nationally representative household survey data. The 
results suggest that, despite the TNVS using a categorical targeting approach that did 
not discriminate by wealth, it still led to a large increase in incremental ownership of 
mosquito nets, with limited evidence of displacement of unsubsidised sales. While no 
evidence is found of an additional TNVS voucher decreasing the number of 
unsubsidised sales in the same period, results indicate that an additional TNVS voucher 
reduced the probability of purchasing any unsubsidised net in the same period by 14 
percent. The findings also highlight the critical role played by social learning or 
campaign messaging in increasing mosquito net ownership. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The subsidisation of public health products (PHPs) has become a popular approach for 
tackling major public health concerns such as malaria. PHPs are ‘commodities that are 
used for treatment of diseases of public health importance or for the promotion of 
health, which can be provided at the retail level without a “service” attached to them’ 
(Conteh and Hanson, 2003: 1148). Examples include contraception, oral-rehydration 
therapy and mosquito nets.  
The fundamental economic rationale for subsidising PHPs (and other products) 
emerges when a gap exists between actual and socially optimal levels of ownership and 
use of the products (e.g. Barker and Hayami, 1976). Reasons for this may include a low 
willingness to pay (WTP) due to lack of knowledge about the benefits of the product 
or credit and liquidity constraints. The rationale is further reinforced where positive 
externalities exists, as with PHPs that address communicable diseases (Hanson, 2004). 
By reducing the price consumers pay for a PHP, not only will a subsidy increase the 
overall quantity demanded (assuming a downward sloping demand curve), but it may 
help address information failures by providing recipients with an opportunity to 
experience the benefits of the PHP, thereby possibly increasing WTP and raising future 
demand (Nelson, 1970). Changes in WTP may also occur among non-recipients via 
social learning effects (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). On the other hand, however, 
questions remain over whether subsidising products may lead to reference dependence 
(anchoring) around the subsidised price (Köszegi and Rabin, 2006), causing recipients 
to lower their reserve price, lowering future aggregate demand. 
The use of subsidies on mosquito nets has received strong support in recent years, with 
a large number of subsidy programmes being implemented, especially across sub-
Saharan Africa (Kilian et al., 2010, Willey et al., 2012). Mosquito nets have been 
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around for some time though, from the 1980s, more effective insecticide-treated 
mosquito nets (ITNs) were developed and various entomological, efficacy and 
effectiveness trials have found them to be highly effective both at protecting those 
underneath them and in the same house and, when coverage levels are high enough, 
even those in the wider community (Hawley et al., 2003, Lines et al., 1987, Magesa et 
al., 1991, Schellenberg et al., 2001). It is now known that regular use of ITNs in Africa 
can reduce overall child mortality by around 20% (Lengeler, 2004) and the World 
Health Organisation recommends that countries at high risk use a combination of 
periodic campaigns of free ITN distribution and continuous distribution through 
multiple channels (including partially subsidised ITNs through antenatal clinics) to 
maintain universal coverage (WHO, 2014); an approach referred to as ‘catch-up’ and 
‘keep-up’ (Roll Back Malaria, 2005).1  
Despite the central importance of ITNs in helping to combat malaria, and widespread 
support for subsidising them, a number of important questions remain. One such issue 
concerns the extent to which mosquito net subsidy programmes lead to an increase in 
coverage beyond that which would have occurred in the subsidy’s absence (i.e. an 
incremental increase), which will partly depend on how the subsidy is targeted. While 
a subsidy will tend to increase overall coverage by reducing the price faced by 
consumers, if a net purchased with a subsidy simply displaces a net that would have 
been purchased anyway without it, the subsidy may actually lead to fewer new 
purchases than coverage trends suggest. Such a scenario would imply a direct welfare 
gain to the consumer with no additional health benefit, which would also represent a 
                                                 
1 Universal coverage is defined as use by more than 80% of individuals in populations at risk. 
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large opportunity cost in terms of the incremental increase that could have been 
achieved for the same cost, for example, through improved targeting. 
Given the potentially high costs associated with displacement, this study estimates the 
impact of a large-scale voucher subsidy programme for mosquito nets in Tanzania on 
the incremental ownership of nets. In doing so, it contributes to the dearth of empirical 
evidence on this topic. As the following section shows, this is particularly interesting 
to study when subsidies are not narrowly targeted to the poorest (or those who are 
unlikely to purchase commercially-priced nets), as this raises the possibility of 
displacement effects and the question of whether alternative targeting mechanisms 
could have led to higher incremental coverage. This topic should be of interest to policy 
makers who are often challenged to show the value-added and efficiency of their 
policies and, as partial subsidies are likely to remain on the policy agenda, the study 
fills an important gap in the literature. 
The following section sets out the conceptual framework. Section three then reviews 
the existing literature and section four sets out the methods. Section five presents the 
findings, which are discussed in section six along with policy implications. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As discussed in section 3.2, the focus of the analysis in this paper is on the impact of 
voucher subsidies provided to a certain group of individuals, which could be used as 
part payment for any conventional net packaged with insecticide treatment. As such, 
we may model the market for nets as comprising a single market with one source of 
supply, with demand made up of purchases with and without a voucher. Specifically, 
we can consider total household demand for nets in the current year (YT) being 
comprised of the quantity of unsubsidised purchases at the market rate (QdM) and the 
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quantity of subsidised purchases made with a voucher (QdV) (Equation 1). In Tanzania, 
as in other countries, there were also fully subsidised nets (i.e. free nets provided 
through mass campaigns or NGOs), which will affect total demand through any impacts 
on retail purchases with or without a voucher. While these are considered in the 
empirical model later, they are excluded here for the purpose of exposition. 
Equation 1: 
𝒀𝑻
 
=  𝑸𝒅𝑴
 
+  𝑸𝒅𝑽 
 
Unpacking the short-term impacts of the voucher subsidy, theory suggests that by 
lowering the price consumers pay, the receipt of a voucher subsidy might lead to three 
broad scenarios. First, if a voucher is given to someone for whom their marginal 
willingness to pay (MWTP) was already greater than the market price, p, then it may 
reduce demand for unsubsidised nets via a substitution or displacement effect, leading 
to a direct welfare transfer but no incremental increase in net ownership. Second, 
among those for whom their MWTP was < p but > (p – v), where v is the value of the 
voucher, they would purchase a net they otherwise would not have, meaning the 
subsidy leads to an incremental increase in ownership, determined by the overall price 
elasticity of demand. Third, there may be those for whom their MWTP was < p and 
remains < (p – v), meaning the subsidy rate was not high enough and that it does not 
lead to an incremental increase in net ownership.  
Nets bought with a voucher may also potentially be re-sold, either on an individual 
basis or as part of a more systematic process. In so far as subsidised nets are re-sold at 
higher prices, this would effectively then reduce the likelihood of them leading to 
incremental increases in coverage, depending on how close to the market price they 
were sold for, and who they were sold to. 
 7 
Empirically estimating which of the above effects dominates requires us to identify a 
counterfactual that can tell us about demand for unsubsidised nets among similar 
households that did not get a voucher. Given the focus on short-term impacts, the 
analysis in this paper assumes constant returns to scale and constant marginal costs. We 
also do not explore partial equilibrium effects which have been explored elsewhere (see 
below). 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is surprisingly limited empirical evidence on the effect mosquito net subsidies 
have on demand for fully priced unsubsidised nets over the short- or longer-term, 
though a number of studies have looked at the effect of free or partially subsidised nets 
on demand for other subsidised nets. For example, several authors investigate the 
interactions between mass free distribution campaigns and continuous subsidised sales 
in Tanzania. Gingrich et al. (2011a), Gingrich et al. (2011b) and Gingrich et al. (2014) 
find that free ITNs reduced the likelihood of households purchasing a commercial ITN 
with a subsidy voucher. For example, Gingrich et al. (2014) estimate a mass free ITN 
campaign reduced the number of partially subsidised nets being sold by around 34%, 
rising to 57% after six months. However, Renggli et al. (2011) and Eze et al. (2014) 
both find no evidence that mass free net campaigns in Tanzania reduced sales of 
subsidised commercial nets among voucher recipients. A similar finding was made by 
Dupas (2014) through an experiment in Kenya, which tested the effect of different 
levels of subsidy on the purchase of a long-lasting ITN (LLIN) one year later fixed at 
$2.30.2 The study found no evidence that higher subsidies led to any greater reduction 
in the likelihood of purchasing a net in the future.3 
                                                 
2 LLINs were not available in Kenya on the commercial market at the time of the study. 
3 Higher subsidies were actually associated with an increased willingness to purchase future LLINs 
though the effect was not statistically significant. 
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Among the very few studies that do look at the impact on fully priced nets, one looked 
at impacts of free nets on reported WTP and found that the ownership of a free net led 
to a statistically significant decrease in the demand for unsubsidised nets (Chase et al., 
2009). However, reported WTP for ITNs has been shown to differ to observed WTP 
(Onwujekwe et al., 2005), plus the impact of free nets may well differ to the impacts of 
partially subsidised nets. A second study used a partial equilibrium model to simulate 
the effect of a partial voucher subsidy on nets in Tanzania on demand for unsubsidised 
nets, estimating that the increased demand for nets brought about by the subsidy 
crowded-out sales through increasing unsubsidised market prices (Gingrich et al., 
2011a). However, while an increase in commercial prices did occur around 2008, the 
simulation methods used cannot prove a causal link with the subsidy programme, and 
other sources of potential price increases were present, such as the global oil price spike. 
Overall, there is very little empirical evidence on the extent to which partially 
subsidising commercial nets through a large-scale on-going programme leads to 
changes in incremental coverage of nets. This represents an important gap given that 
raising incremental coverage (i.e. that beyond what would have occurred anyway) 
should be a key concern for policy makers as understanding a subsidy programme’s 
effect on incremental coverage provides important information about its efficiency and 
appropriateness of its targeting approach. 
4. METHODS 
4.1 Study selection 
This study uses the case of the Tanzanian National Voucher Scheme (TNVS) – which 
became one of the largest and most widely acclaimed mosquito net subsidy 
programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, pioneering the use of subsidy vouchers for scaling 
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up net coverage at a national scale. The TNVS is chosen as it represents an important 
case study for investigating the impacts of a large-scale voucher subsidy on incremental 
coverage, and also due to the unique availability of nationally representative household 
data. As details of the programme have been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. 
Gingrich et al., 2011a) only a brief overview of its key features is provided here. 
The TNVS started in October 2004 and involved distributing discount vouchers to 
pregnant women attending antenatal care (ANC) and, from November 2006, parents of 
children under five attending their first measles vaccination.4 Vouchers entitled the 
holder to a fixed discount on the retail price of a conventional mosquito net of their 
choice at participating retailers with a package of insecticide treatment, offering the 
holder a discount of 2750 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) (around $US 2.50), raised to TZS 
3250 (around $US 2.90) in January 2007, with any remaining cost paid by the voucher 
holder as a top-up.5 This represented a subsidy of around 70-90% based on 2005-2006 
net prices (Hanson et al., 2008), though increasing retail prices lowered the effective 
subsidy rate over time, leading programme designers to shift to a fixed price of TZS 
500 for an ITN being set for voucher holders in 2009. 
This study looks specifically at the period from 2004 until 2008. Analysis after 2008 is 
not possible due to the lack of appropriate nationally representative household survey 
data. While funding for the programme was suspended in 2015, data covering the 
period between 2004 and 2008 offer a unique opportunity to empirically investigate 
how far the categorical targeting of partially subsidised nets led to an incremental 
                                                 
4 To improve targeting towards poorer households that could not even afford the top-up payment, an 
Equity Voucher was piloted in six districts in April 2007 entitling the holder to a free net, though very 
few vouchers were distributed and evaluations indicated it had limited effect, so was not brought to scale 
(Marchant et al., 2008). 
5 Figures based on an average exchange rate of TZS 1105 to US$ 1 from October 2004 to May 2006 
(Oanda.com). 
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increase in coverage; an issue of continued relevance to this day given that the approach 
remains on the menu of options for policy makers and the fact that likely threats to 
funding for global health in the future mean targeted approaches are likely to be 
increasingly proposed again for LLINs. Furthermore, aside from the introduction of 
LLINs, overall net markets have not changed greatly since 2008 and so the results are 
of relevance to newer subsidy programmes. 
Data from the TNVS household surveys show a clear increase in the proportion of 
households owning at least one net between 2005 and 2008 (Figure 1). At first glance 
the TNVS appears to have contributed significantly to this, along with a number of 
large free ITN campaigns (Figure 2). However, while overall ownership clearly appears 
to have increased, it is not yet clear what the effect of the TNVS was on incremental 
coverage. We see from Figure 2 that, since the TNVS began in 2004, the annual total 
number of nets purchased increased until 2007, driven by the increase in subsidised 
nets. However, at the same time, the number of unsubsidised net purchases declined. 
While a number of factors could explain this reduction in unsubsidised purchases, this 
study offers an insight into the extent to which partially subsidised nets may have 
played a role. 
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4.2 Data 
The main data used come from the 2008 Tanzania National ITN Programme 
(NATNETS) household survey. The full sample of 6,918 households was selected 
using a two-stage cluster random sampling method. At the first stage, 24 districts were 
randomly sampled (stratified by zone) and at the second stage 10 wards (clusters) of 30 
households in each of the districts were selected based on probability proportionate to 
size. Within each ward, one sub-village was selected using simple random sampling, 
within which households were randomly selected.  
Other data sources used include retailer data from MEDA and 2002 Tanzania census 
data. Malaria prevalence was obtained from the Tanzania HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
Indicator Survey 2007-08. 
In the absence of income data, we construct a wealth index using Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA), which is appropriate for discrete data (Howe et al., 
2008).6 The index was constructed using information on housing conditions and asset 
ownership including livestock, with households then split into five quintiles based on 
their score (Annex 1). 
4.3 Empirical specification 
In Equation 2, Yit is the number of unsubsidised mosquito nets purchased by household 
i in the past 12 months. The key variable of interest, Vit is the number of TNVS vouchers 
received by the household in the same period. As shown in Table 1, a sizeable 
proportion of vouchers went unredeemed, with redemption rates declining over time. 
The main reason given for non-redemption in national household surveys was that the 
                                                 
6  Experimentation using Principal Components Analysis suggests no substantive differences in the 
results. 
 13 
voucher recipient had no money to pay the top-up (Hanson et al., 2006, Marchant et al., 
2007, Marchant et al., 2008), though whether this reflects a lack of cash or low MWTP 
is unclear.  
As voucher allocation was not random, those that received them may share certain 
characteristics that make their purchase decisions different to those of eligible non-
recipients. Table 2 provides a comparison of voucher recipients and eligible non-
recipients using a sub-sample of 1,626 households and shows that, in some respects, 
both are quite similar but that there are also small significant differences in others. For 
example, those that received any voucher were more likely to have heard of the subsidy 
programme and more likely to be headed by someone that was slightly older and that 
had more years of formal education. While all of these factors can be controlled for in 
the analysis, we cannot rule out the possibility that receipt of vouchers may also be 
related to unobserved differences.  
In order to test whether the potential endogeneity of voucher receipt was a problem, it 
was tested using a control function (CF) approach (Wooldridge, 2007). First, a probit 
model was run estimating voucher receipt as a function of a range of exogenous 
variables used in the second-stage estimation, plus an instrument that satisfies the 
orthogonality condition of an instrumental variable. The reduced form residuals were 
then included in the second stage, which controls for potential endogeneity of voucher 
receipt and is tested through the significance of these residuals in the second stage.  
As it was not possible to identify an appropriate instrument, a second broader eligible 
group was created to include both households with women that attended ANC, as well 
as those who were pregnant at interview, in the past 12 months, or had a child in the 
last 12 months. It was then possible to use whether the household had attended ANC as 
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the instrument, which is necessarily correlated with voucher receipt but is not expected 
to lead to an independent increase in YMit except through individuals receiving a voucher 
(satisfying the exclusion restriction). Receiving a voucher in itself would unlikely lead 
to an unsubsidised purchase as the household could purchase one at a lower price with 
the voucher and mosquito nets were well established in Tanzania at the time. As 
expected, the instrument in an OLS regression explaining Vit is highly statistically 
significant (p=0.02) but is highly insignificant in explaining YMit (p=0.56), suggesting 
it has no independent effect on YMit.   
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Other key factors likely to explain demand for unsubsidised nets include the number of 
free nets obtained by the household in the past 12 months (YFit) and the existing stock 
of nets (13 months ago or longer) (YTit-1), for which we would expect a negative 
relationship. The literature on demand for mosquito nets in sub-Saharan Africa also 
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suggests the importance of a number of other covariates at the household and local level 
(Xit), which are also included in the model (see Table 2) (Carneiro et al., 2012, Chase 
et al., 2009, Poulos et al., 2006). 
Equation 2:  
𝒀𝒊𝒕
𝑴 =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝒀𝒊𝒕
𝑭 + 𝜷𝒀𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑻 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
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It turns out that for around 84 percent of households Yit equals zero while 12 percent Yit 
equals one (Annex 2). As such, as well as estimating Equation 2 using OLS, a probit 
model is also estimated. 
There is some evidence of diversion in the TNVS after the period of study through 
voucher fraud (MEDA, 2010, NMCP, 2014) and tracking studies prior to 2008 estimate 
that around 10% of distributed vouchers sampled were likely acquired by ineligible 
recipients who could not be tracked (Nathan et al., 2007, Nathan et al., 2008). One 
cannot rule out the possibility that some eligible recipients may have even resold their 
nets at commercial or near commercial prices. However, it is impossible to determine 
what proportion of subsidised nets were truly re-sold or whether any secondary buyers 
would have bought a full price net anyway and indicate any systematic bias. 
5. RESULTS 
The main results from the various models are presented in Table 3. As can be seen from 
the results for model one, the test for endogeneity of Vit  (the coefficient against the 
residuals from the first stage reduced form equation) suggests that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of Vit being exogenous. It may simply be that accounting for the 
observed differences between voucher recipients and the comparison group was 
sufficient. We therefore prefer the results from the other models.  
Looking at these, and heterogeneity analysis carried out on them by wealth quintile 
(Table 4), there are four main findings. Firstly, it can be seen that the receipt of TNVS 
vouchers appears to have had very little effect on the number of unsubsidised nets 
purchased, though, the probit results indicate that each additional TNVS voucher 
decreases the probability of purchasing any unsubsidised net by approximately seven 
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percentage points, which translates into a reduction of around 14 percent compared to 
the baseline mean number of unsubsidised mosquito nets owned. 
Secondly, the displacement effect appears to be greater among wealthier voucher 
recipients based on the OLS estimates, though the results are only marginally 
significant (p<0.10) (Table 4). This may be due to the small sample size. As results 
from Table 4 show though, the magnitude of effect is in the region of four times greater 
among the wealthiest voucher recipients compared to the full sample effect in the OLS 
model. 
Thirdly, despite the small displacement effect among voucher recipients, the highly 
significant positive signs against the variable for whether the household had heard of 
the pregnant woman voucher indicates that simply having heard of the subsidy appears 
to have led to households purchasing a higher number of unsubsidised nets (consistent 
with Dupas, 2014). This result is robust across all models, with the estimate from the 
probit model indicating a significant positive increase in the probability of purchasing 
an unsubsidised net of 10 percentage points; a 19 percent increase against the baseline 
average. 
Fourthly, the receipt of free nets during the past 12 months is not associated negatively 
with unsubsidised purchases (consistent with Renggli et al., 2011 and Eze et al., 2014). 
Most of the other variables are of the expected sign, with the exception of district 
average net prices being significantly but positively related to unsubsidised purchases. 
However, the effect size is less than 0.0001 and this may be due to imprecise 
measurement. 
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Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Limitations 
Before discussing the results, the following main limitations should be noted. First, the 
allocation of subsidy vouchers was not random and opens up the possibility of selection 
bias. To address potential endogeneity of voucher receipt, the study controlled for a 
wide range of covariates and adopted a control function approach. Although the control 
function itself could only be run using a broader comparison group, the results did not 
indicate any clear endogeneity. Second, our dependence on a single cross-section of 
data may limit the efficiency of the estimates compared to if panel data were available, 
and restrict the ability to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, the results 
presented do not account for the effect any potential re-sale of subsidised nets may have 
had on incremental ownership of nets. However, as mentioned, the extent of secondary 
markets is expected to be relatively small and any resale at below market rates could 
have led to either incremental increases or displacement and so no systematic bias is 
anticipated. Lastly, the analysis does not differentiate between whether any 
unsubsidised nets purchased were conventional, bundled with insecticide, or ITNs 
meaning we cannot explore which type of net the observed impacts of vouchers or free 
nets relate to, though ITN ownership was still below 50 percent by 2008 in part due to 
higher prices. 
6.2 Discussion and policy implications 
Overall, the results from the regression analysis combined with the earlier data on 
overall net sales suggests that the TNVS has played a crucially important role in 
increasing incremental net ownership. This suggests that the reduction in unsubsidised 
purchases shown in Figure 2 may well have arisen due to other factors, not least the 
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rising price of nets, which was likely due in part to the global oil price spike at the 
time. 7  The low levels of displacement are perhaps not too surprising given the 
increasing retail price of ITNs (which would lead to lower unsubsidised sales in the 
comparison group). This highlights the crucial point that governments that introduce 
PHP subsidy programmes must not see it as a substitute for also trying to reduce or at 
least stabilise commercial prices. Otherwise, higher prices will end up costing the 
government in the form of higher subsidies and mean that those would have previously 
purchased an unsubsidised PHP may also then require a subsidy to maintain coverage. 
The results of the heterogeneity analysis are consistent with neoclassical consumer 
theory when we see that displacement appears to mostly occur among the wealthiest 
households, who are also more likely and better able to purchase a full price net in the 
absence of the subsidy. However, the fact that the TNVS still led to an incremental 
increase in coverage among these wealthiest households (Table 4) suggests that a 
narrower poverty-targeted approach (e.g. using a proxy means-test) rather than the 
categorical approach would likely not have been more cost-effective in terms of raising 
incremental coverage. Reasons for this include the fact that the TNVS approach 
maximised coverage by targeting pregnant women who were expected to sleep under 
the net with their children, the higher costs associated with proxy mean-test targeting 
(e.g. Devereux et al., 2015), and the fact that the level of subsidy would have had to be 
further increased to raise incremental coverage among some of the poorest who did not 
even redeem their voucher (section 4.3). 
Another main finding in the results was that the TNVS may have led to increasing 
unsubsidised purchases through a form of social learning effect in that those who had 
                                                 
7 Interview with senior NATNETS official.  
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heard of pregnant women vouchers were more likely to purchase an unsubsidised net. 
This finding is consistent with Dupas (2014), who found that households were more 
likely to purchase an ITN when the density of households around them that received a 
subsidised net was greater. The finding is also consistent with the view of a senior 
NATNETS official, interviewed before the analysis, who highlighted that a key aspect 
of Tanzania’s successful experience had been the on-going communications and 
marketing throughout society, including the role of politicians advertising the 
importance of nets in the media. While marketing and communications alone are 
unlikely to be able to rapidly and substantially increase the ownership of PHPs in 
contexts where the market price remains high, the finding does lend support to the idea 
that marketing and communications should form a key part of PHP subsidy 
interventions, as has been traditional in social marketing programmes for many years. 
Lastly, the differential effects of receiving vouchers for partially subsidised nets versus 
free nets appears to suggest an important distinction which has so far not been drawn 
out in the literature on mosquito net subsidies. That is, while partially subsidised nets 
will affect the beneficiary’s budget constraint, free nets generally will not, resulting in 
an increased ability and perhaps higher marginal willingness to pay compared to if the 
household has to pay even a subsidised price. The findings are in line with a number of 
other studies (Dupas, 2014, Eze et al., 2014, Renggli et al., 2011) and indicate that free 
nets should also be considered to play a role in malaria reduction strategies, at least as 
a complementary measure to partially subsidised mosquito nets.   
6.3 Conclusion 
This study set out to investigate the effect that a partial subsidy programme for 
mosquito nets had on incremental ownership of unsubsidised nets. Using the case of 
the TNVS, the study estimated the effect at the household level using national 
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household survey data and found no evidence of subsidy vouchers decreasing the 
number of unsubsidised nets purchased, but a small and significant reduction in the 
probability of purchasing any unsubsidised net. The displacement effect appears to be 
greater among wealthier households, though the high levels of incremental ownership 
even among these wealthiest households suggests that the additional benefits in terms 
of incremental coverage from a means-based targeting approach would not exceed the 
high additional costs of such a targeting approach. The results were also robust in 
suggesting that simply having heard of the TNVS may have led to higher unsubsidised 
purchases through a social learning or programme messaging effect. Further research 
is now needed to unpack the potential longer-term dynamic impacts that large 
programmes such as the TNVS may have on the private sector and market prices.  
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TABLES  
 
 
Table 1: Distribution and redemption rate of TNVS vouchers (July 2005 to 
March 2009) 
 
 
 Pregnant women vouchers Infant vouchers 
Period Distributed Redeemed Rate Distributed Redeemed Rate 
July 2005 to 
March 2006 
339,750 
 
275,473 
 
81% 
 
   
April 2006 to 
March 2007 
1,203,900 
 
996,436 
 
83% 
 
   
April 2007 to 
March 2008 
1,358,075 
 
972,921 
 
72% 
 
472,025 
 
309,166 
 
65% 
 
April 2008 to 
March 2009 
916,334 
 
547,860 
 
60% 
 
525,525 
 
295,807 
 
56% 
 
 
Source: National Insecticide-Treated Nets Programme (NATNETS) data sheets. Note: Infant 
vouchers were available from November 2006, though it takes some time for stubs and 
vouchers to be returned (by clinics and retailers respectively) and then counted. 
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Table 2: Comparison of voucher recipient and non-recipient households 
 
Notes: Comparison group represents eligible households that met the conditions to receive a voucher 
but did not receive one. ***, ** & * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Variable (1) Non-
receipt of 
voucher 
(n=774) 
Standard 
error 
(2) Receipt 
of at least 
one voucher 
(n=852) 
Standard 
error 
t-stat for 
difference 
between 
(1) and (2) 
# of unsubsidised nets 
purchased in 12 months prior to 
interview 
0.25 0.02 0.21 0.02 1.12 
# of free nets received during 
12 months prior to interview 
0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.37 
# of nets purchased from other 
sources during 12 months prior 
to interview 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.86 
Total # of nets owned 13 months 
prior to interview 
0.67 0.03 0.83 0.03 -3.26*** 
Respondent heard of TNVS 
pregnant women vouchers 
0.77 0.02 0.91 0.01 -8.02*** 
Respondent heard of TNVS 
infant vouchers 
0.41 0.02 0.55 0.02 -5.84*** 
Weighted district median price 
of a 4x6x7 bundled net (TZS) 
3110 12.03 3150 11.03 -2.48*** 
Participating retailer to 
population ratio (x 10,000) 
1.41 0.02 1.47 0.02 -1.74* 
Percentage of children (6-59 
months) testing positive for 
malaria in the region 
19.70 0.51 19.54 0.47 0.22 
Rural household  0.67 0.02 0.65 0.02 0.87 
Semi-urban household 0.26 0.02 0.27 0.02 -0.56 
Urban household 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.62 
Quintile 1 0.22 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.89 
Quintile 2 0.24 0.01 0.19 0.01 2.22** 
Quintile 3 0.22 0.01 0.23 0.01 -0.09 
Quintile 4 0.17 0.01 0.20 0.01 -1.70* 
Quintile 5 (wealthiest) 0.14 0.01 0.17 0.01 -1.59 
Household size 6.08 0.09 6.07 0.10 0.08 
# of children in household 2 
years old or younger 
1.25 0.03 1.20 0.03 1.31 
# of people in household 50 
years old or over 
0.31 0.02 0.35 0.02 -1.31 
# of women in household aged 
15 to 49 
1.3 0.03 1.4 0.02 -0.47 
Female headed household 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.22 
Age of household head 37.4 0.57 39.0 0.53 -2.09** 
Household head employed in 
professional role or business 
0.10 0.01 0.13 0.01 -2.23** 
Household head has no formal 
education 
0.23 0.02 0.19 0.01 2.28** 
Household head has 1-7 years 
education 
0.15 0.01 0.13 0.01 1.36 
Household head has 8 + years 
education 
0.61 0.02 0.68 0.02 -2.93*** 
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Table 3: Estimates for number of unsubsidised nets purchased in past 12 months 
 (1) CF (2) OLS (4) Probit 
# of TNVS vouchers received during past 12 months -0.315 -0.0541 -0.0722** 
 (0.239) (0.0399) (0.0344) 
Residuals from reduced form (CF) estimate 0.275   
 (0.251)   
Respondent heard of TNVS pregnant women vouchers 0.269*** 0.207** 0.100** 
 (0.101) (0.0888) (0.0463) 
Respondent heard of TNVS infant vouchers 0.00103 -0.0370 -0.0310 
 (0.0726) (0.0780) (0.0559) 
# of free nets received during past 12m 0.495 0.599 0.0957 
 (0.356) (0.405) (0.0647) 
# of nets purchased during past 12m (other sources) 0.310 0.267 0.141** 
 (0.204) (0.202) (0.0676) 
Total # of nets owned 13 months prior to interview -0.0988** -0.110** -0.0479* 
 (0.0396) (0.0506) (0.0255) 
Weighted district median price of a 4x6x7 bundled net (TZS) 0.000203 0.000295** 0.000245*** 
 (0.000135) (0.000135) (7.47e-05) 
% children (6-59m) in region tested positive for malaria -0.000885 -0.00107 0.000482 
 (0.00232) (0.00237) (0.00144) 
Rural household  0.258* 0.389*** 0.256*** 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.0864) 
Semi-urban household 0.310** 0.435*** 0.297*** 
 (0.154) (0.140) (0.109) 
Quintile 2 0.0196 0.0740 0.0141 
 (0.0730) (0.0815) (0.0589) 
Quintile 3 -0.0281 0.0116 -0.0110 
 (0.0677) (0.0670) (0.0616) 
Quintile 4 0.0576 0.0678 0.0494 
 (0.0961) (0.0935) (0.0706) 
Quintile 5 (wealthiest) 0.351*** 0.398** 0.266*** 
 (0.132) (0.174) (0.0822) 
Household head has 1-7 years education 0.0506 0.230* 0.0698 
 (0.102) (0.137) (0.0665) 
Household head had 8 + years education 0.0607 0.126* 0.107** 
 (0.0617) (0.0682) (0.0447) 
Household size 0.0205 0.0111 -0.00532 
 (0.0158) (0.0183) (0.0102) 
Household head employed in professional role 0.0400 0.0571 0.0693 
 (0.0651) (0.105) (0.0959) 
Household head is 50 years or older 0.474** 0.605*** 0.291** 
 (0.225) (0.226) (0.122) 
Household head is 30 to 49 years old 0.123 0.0815 0.142** 
 (0.0808) (0.0725) (0.0633) 
Household head is 22 to 29 years old 0.157* 0.0477 0.0713 
 (0.0934) (0.0597) (0.0672) 
Female headed household 0.0260 0.0152 -0.0117 
 (0.0830) (0.0943) (0.0665) 
# of women in household aged 15 to 49 0.0337 0.0206 -0.0305 
 (0.0547) (0.0700) (0.0377) 
# of people in household 50 years old or over -0.0503 -0.112 0.0350 
 (0.106) (0.144) (0.0736) 
# of children in household 2 years old or younger 0.0488 0.0629 0.0811*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0435) (0.0297) 
Participating retailer to population ratio (x 10,000) -0.0299 -0.0758 -0.0626 
 (0.0634) (0.0674) (0.0394) 
Constant -1.162** -1.549***  
 (0.470) (0.414)  
Mean outcome variable at ‘baseline’ (≥ 13months ago) 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Observations 1,987 1,626 1,626 
R-squared 0.20 0.10  
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5% or 10%. Probit results are marginal effects. Baseline value of 
dependent variable is mean number of ITNs owned across sample 13 months ago. 
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Table 4: Sub-population analysis of voucher effect by wealth quintile 
 
 
 
Subpopulation estimates calculated using full sample of 1,626 observations. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Note that baseline value of dependent 
variable is mean number of nets owned across sample 13 months ago. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Overall Quintile 1  
(least 
wealthy) 
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
(wealthiest) 
       
OLS estimate -.05717** 0.0559 0.0582 -0.0299 0.112 -0.220* 
Standard error (0.025) (0.060) (0.045) (0.057) (0.071) (0.130) 
       
       
Mean outcome variable 
at ‘baseline’ (13 months 
ago or longer) 
 
0.52 0.37 0.30 0.45 0.43 0.72 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Summary of variables used for Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
 
 
Means calculated on full sample. First dimension accounts for 75.68% of inertia. 
 
  
Category Variable Dimension 1 
score 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Toilet No toilet -1.027 0.11 0.32 
 Pit latrine -0.206 0.83 0.37 
 Flush toilet 5.128 0.06 0.23 
 Rents the house 2.559 0.09 0.29 
Water Piped / external water 2.257 0.16 0.37 
 Public tab 0.555 0.24 0.43 
 Well / hole / spring -0.903 0.42 0.49 
 Surface water -0.817 0.17 0.37 
Fuel Uses charcoal 3.647 0.15 0.36 
 Uses firewood / dung -0.710 0.84 0.37 
Housing Rudimentary or finished 
floor 
2.486 0.17 0.37 
 Iron sheet or tiled roof 0.817 0.58 0.49 
 Has electricity 4.329 0.12 0.32 
Assets Owns a fridge 5.913 0.05 0.21 
 Owns a TV 4.907 0.09 0.28 
 Owns a radio 0.361 0.67 0.47 
 Owns a bicycle -0.111 0.45 0.50 
 Owns a mobile 1.524 0.36 0.48 
Livestock Owns ducks or chickens -0.431 0.62 0.49 
 Owns other animals (e.g. 
goats, sheep or cattle) 
-0.519 0.40 0.49 
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Annex 2: Cross tabulation of number of unsubsidised net purchases and TNVS 
vouchers received during the past 12 months 
 
 TNVS vouchers  
Unsubsidised 
nets 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 641 654 61 4 1 1,361 
1 94 89 11 0 0 194 
2 28 23 2 0 0 53 
3 5 3 0 0 0 8 
4 5 1 0 0 0 6 
5 1 1 0 0 0 2 
6 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 774 773 74 4 1 1,626 
 
  
